Multinationals Need Closer Ties as Globalization Retreats

Global companies would do well to cultivate relationships in the countries where they operate to counterbalance increasingly powerful governments.

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Chris Gash/theispot.com

Globalization is in retreat, and multinationals are on the defensive. Across the world, countries rich and poor have erected trade barriers and set up outright export bans to cope with the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. In 2020, respirators, surgical gowns, medicines, and other lifesaving equipment were hard to come by. Two years later, it’s wheat, palm oil, beef, and other food products — and that’s not including other items related to the sanctions that nations have imposed on Russia.

Citing national interest, governments have reclaimed much of the power multinationals had acquired over decades of almost unfettered globalization. The tilt in the balance of power can be traced back to the 2008 global financial crisis, when banks and corporations had to be bailed out by governments with taxpayers’ money. In the years since, world trade growth has faltered as China has turned inward and the United States has embraced an “America First” policy. The pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine, neither of which were thought probable, have added momentum to de-globalization — and government fiat.

As a result, multinational corporations (MNCs), whose very rise was premised on free movement of goods and labor, are at a disadvantage. Accustomed to friendly governments and easy access to overseas markets, they have not cultivated the sophisticated political judgment to manage government and public expectations.

Alibaba founder Jack Ma, for one, openly criticized financial regulations in China in October 2020, crossing a line that led Chinese authorities to scupper his fintech conglomerate’s initial public offering and launch a crackdown on the country’s Big Tech companies. Last year, India’s commerce minister publicly took the country’s largest conglomerate to task for similar intransigence, after Tata Group griped about tough new e-commerce rules.

If conditions for MNCs in their home countries are now less cozy, spare a thought for their operations in foreign countries. Relationships between MNCs and host governments may deteriorate over time, along with the bargaining power that MNCs initially enjoyed on entry. Yet little is known about what makes some MNCs better able than others to deal with host hostility.

To find out, we studied eight MNCs involved in disputes with foreign governments in South America between 2001 and 2012: Cemex in Venezuela; Telefonica, Repsol, Vivendi, and Endesa in Argentina; Telecom Italia in Bolivia; Shell in Nicaragua; and Iberdrola in Guatemala. As history seems to repeat itself with regularity, the wave of globalization led to widespread use of local partnerships by many expanding multinationals, which believed it was the fastest and arguably most successful way to internationalize. Then, as globalization receded, its retreat revealed the drawbacks of local partnership, and former advantages became debilitating weaknesses. Our research shows this fatal side effect.

Our findings, published in the Journal of Management Studies, show that reliance on local partners could inadvertently create what we call a liability of insiderness. Local partners, whom MNCs often collaborate with in the form of joint ventures, isolate foreign investors from local stakeholders. This precludes the multinationals from developing direct contacts, nurturing local ties, and building local reputation — all of which can make a significant difference to the MNCs’ capacity to react and adapt to the sudden hostility of local governments.

Liability of Insiderness

We focused on sectors — including construction, energy, and mining — in which high sunk costs reduce bargaining power and can make exits difficult and costly. We also zeroed in on disputes that occurred in countries with similar institutional systems. All of the companies analyzed had filed expropriation claims with the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the leading entity for settling investment disputes between foreign firms and host governments.

We conducted 63 semistructured interviews with 43 MNC executives, managers of peer companies, government officers, representatives of political associations, diplomacy and political economics experts, and labor union experts. We also examined analyst reports, newspaper articles, and corporate, legal, and government documents.

Anticipation, Escalation, Expropriation

We charted three phases of increasing hostility from political authorities: anticipation, escalation, and expropriation. Four of the cases we studied underestimated the expropriation threat at the first sign of trouble. They took remedial action only after the government hostility became evident, and they ultimately failed to secure local and international support. Most of these companies exited their host countries and received minimal or no compensation for their losses.

A second group of companies picked up on early warning signals and mobilized promptly to gather information, disseminate their own narratives, and strengthen local and international support. Three of them maintained operations in the host country, even after the expropriation, and/or received compensation from the host government.

Anticipation. Disputes typically begin with symbolic, ambiguous actions that hint at the government’s intention to intervene in an industry or the economy, usually in the name of protecting its people’s interests. The actions might include setting price ceilings, increasing corporate taxes, or using trade unions to pressure MNCs through public protests or strikes.

In response to this first phase of government hostility, four of the companies — Telecom Italia, Vivendi, Iberdrola, and Endesa — relied on local partners to gather additional information and monitor the situation. What they got was filtered information that painted a partial and inaccurate picture that led them to delegate action as well.

“We were myopic,” a director of Telecom Italia told us. “We delegated and we should have intervened in first person.”

These four companies had adopted a networking strategy that we refer to as mediated embedding. This arm’s-length approach often stems from companies’ narrow focus on profits. According to our interviewees, Telecom Italia saw the local investment as merely “a cash cow” while Iberdrola, a Spanish electric utility company, did not think it was necessary to invest in the local communities. Telecom Italia even incurred local anger by violating an agreement with a local trade union and firing workers.

Endesa, another of the MNCs that relied on a local partner to manage its relationship with the host government, built goodwill with local people by giving aid to the underprivileged and providing training and other benefits. This might explain why the Spanish electricity company managed to mobilize local support and renegotiate tariffs with the host government in Argentina. It ended up staying in the country for five more years.

In contrast, four other companies in our sample — Shell, Telefonica, Cemex, and Repsol — sought information from local lobbyists, trade unions, or other MNCs. This helped them connect the dots of incipient government hostility and spurred them to take early action.

These MNCs directly owned and managed their local investments, had built relationships with a broad range of local stakeholders, and liaised with the central government through lobbyists, “high-level contacts,” or informal interactions with political authorities. We call their networking strategy proximal embedding.

Local stakeholders helped these companies detect subtle signals of targeted hostility. Managers at the Mexican building materials company Cemex and Spanish energy company Repsol, for example, noticed that some contractors were delaying payments and some large clients had changed providers. The companies sprang into action. A Cemex executive recalled: “We collected evidence and documents. [Political authorities] were saying or doing something one day. We would take note of it and write it down. We had it documented. We never feared that we lacked arguments.”

Escalation. In this phase, the MNCs began to face targeted government accusations of failing to fulfill their investment commitments or causing pollution. They also had to contend with demonstrations, fines, increased taxes, class action lawsuits, and media criticism.

Managers of multinational corporations operating through local partners misjudged the situation even more. In the case of French water services multinational Vivendi, managers maintained that the hostility they faced in Argentina was due to “unfortunate events” rather than a deliberate plan to seize their assets.

They also preferred to avoid direct confrontation, seeking instead to appease the authorities. As a Telecom Italia director lamented, “In Bolivia, my impression is now that the local partner knew [of the threat] but did not say. …When there is no partnership, you have a better understanding of what happens.”

In contrast, managers of proximally embedded companies had already sensed danger and actively sounded out local stakeholders to gauge whether they shared the government’s hostility.

Cemex’s managers, for example, contacted suppliers to renegotiate the terms of their contracts. They met with clients that had stopped or delayed payments, and set up meetings with local employees to discuss rumors that senior executives were negligent. Cemex also reached out to friendly government contacts and mobilized lobbyists to gather information about the government’s motives.

Proactive managers of proximally embedded MNCs thus concluded that a confrontation with the government was inevitable and began to plan accordingly. All of them sought to highlight how their investments had contributed to local economic development and to convey that the actions proposed by the government would harm, not help, local communities.

For example, Telefonica stressed how its “modern management technologies increased business efficiency and quality of services and goods offered to the community.”

It asserted that the government did not have the capacity to finance the necessary investments in telecommunications. Repsol, meanwhile, warned that casting out MNCs would have a chilling effect on foreign investment in Argentina.

Expropriation. Threats and accusations finally gave way to the formal cancellation or modification of concessions (Iberdrola and Endesa), expropriation of assets (Cemex, Repsol, Telefonica, and Telecom Italia), or seizure of rent sources (Shell and Vivendi) without compensation.

Managers of companies operating through local partners (Vivendi, Iberdrola, and Telecom Italia) now faced broad-based hostility from local stakeholders. These MNCs’ only recourse was to file complaints with ICSID, even while they prepared to exit their host countries.

In contrast, proximally embedded MNCs intensified their efforts to mobilize local stakeholders and put pressure on host governments to settle disputes amicably, or at least not to cause further harm to their remaining assets.

Endesa, the only MNC to pursue a hybrid strategy, lost control of its board and was forced to sell its majority stake in its Argentinean subsidiary. But, with the help of local supporters, it was able to persuade the government to renegotiate tariffs and continue its operations in the country.

Our study reveals the importance of MNCs nurturing direct, local ties and investing in social initiatives that benefit local communities. In our study, companies that operated in foreign countries through joint ventures with local businesses tended to rely too much on their partners to relate to stakeholders. Often, this created a liability of insiderness and caused them to be complacent and miss early warning signs of hostile government actions. In comparison, MNCs that operated through directly controlled subsidiaries were more hands-on and more likely to gain the goodwill of locals, enabling them to react quickly to government hostility.

Topics

Frontiers

An MIT SMR initiative exploring how technology is reshaping the practice of management.
More in this series

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